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ABSTRACT

In 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Elgin v.
Department of the Treasury, clarified the standard that should apply when a
federal statute purports to remove judicial review of all constitutional claims.
The Court confirmed that, if a statute only channels judicial review of a
constitutional claim into a specific avenue (for example, through administrative
review and then the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals), then congressional
intent to do so need only be "fairly discernible." Alternatively, if a statute
precludes all judicial review of a constitutional claim, there must be "clear
congressional intent." The Court explained that the reason for these differing
standards is to avoid the "serious constitutional question that would arise if an

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law. Many thanks to
Bryan Gonzalez, the editors of the West Virginia Law Review, Associate Dean Max J. Minzner
and Associate Professor Dawinder "Dave" S. Sidhu of the University of New Mexico School of
Law, my research assistants Rebekah Gallegos and Shayne Huffman, attorneys Laura Schauer
Ives and Maureen A. Sanders, the American Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico, and the
faculty of the University of Kansas School of Law for their important feedback.
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agency statute were construed to preclude all judicial review of a constitutional
claim." Courts have a duty to protect and interpret the Constitution and
claimants have a right to meaningful review of their constitutional claims.
That serious constitutional question does arise when probationary
federal public employees, who are not fully covered by Civil Service Reform
Act ("CSRA") protections, allege constitutional violations related to their
employment. For example, the CSRA right to directly petition the Merit
Systems Protection Board ("MSPB") and to appeal to the Federal Circuit Court
of Appeals is unavailable to these employees. Instead, probationary federal
employees who allege that their employment was terminated in violation of the
U.S. Constitution may only petition the U.S. Office of Special Counsel. If the
Office of Special Counsel denies an employee's claim, that claim is terminated
without any further administrative or judicial review.
This result raises the serious constitutional question, one that dates
back to Marbury v. Madison, about the judicial duty of review of constitutional
claims, particularly those involving individual rights. Given the lack of
meaningful review of constitutional claims brought by federal probationary
employees, a judicial remedy must be provided to ensure deterrence of
unconstitutional acts by federal employers. That remedy should be extending a
cause of action from Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents to probationary
federal employees who otherwise will not receive meaningful review of their
constitutional claims.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The supremacy of law demands that there shall be opportunity
to have some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law
was applied and whether the proceeding in which facts were
adjudicated was conducted regularly. To that extent, the
person asserting a right, whatever its source, should be
entitled to the independent judgment of a court on the ultimate
question of constitutionality.
- Justice Louis Brandeis 1

The presumptive power of the federal courts to hear
constitutional challenges is well established.
- Justice Samuel Alito 2

St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
Elgin v. Dep't of Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2147 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court of the United States, in Elgin v. Department of the
Treasury,3 addressed whether the Civil Service Reform Act ("CSRA") 4 was the
exclusive remedy for federal employees who alleged that the federal laws
authorizing their terminations were facially unconstitutional. 5 In Elgin, the
plaintiff employees were terminated for having failed to register for the military
selective service. 6 Federal law both requires all males between 18 and 26 years
of age to register for the draft 7 (a registration requirement) and bans anyone
who "knowingly or willfully" violates the registration requirement from
employment with any executive agency (an employment condition). 8
Several males, who failed to register and thereby were terminated from
their employment with federal agencies,9 challenged the federal employment
condition as unconstitutional on its face, arguing that it constituted a bill of
attainder and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, because the registration requirement applies only to men. 10 These
plaintiffs filed an original action in federal district court. 11
The CSRA required the plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative
remedies before the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"), with appeal to
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. 12 The plaintiffs in Elgin argued that,
because they challenged the federal selective service statute as unconstitutional
on its face, theirs was not a case that Congress intended to channel into the
CSRA's administrative scheme as the exclusive remedy, and therefore suit
could be brought by the plaintiffs in a federal district court in the first
instance. 13 The plaintiffs argued for the application of the heightened standard
from Webster v. Doe. 14 In Webster, the Supreme Court held that, in order to
find that Congress meant to preclude all judicial review of constitutional claims
in federal court, there must be a "heightened showing" of clear congressional
intent. 15

132 S. Ct. 2126 (2012).
4

Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1105 (2013)).

Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2130.
6

Id. at 2131.
5 U.S.C. § 3328 (2012); 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (2013).

Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2131.
9

Id.

IO

Id.

II

Id.

12

Id. at 2130-31.

13

Id. at 2131.
486 U.S. 592 (1988).

14
15

Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2132 (citing Webster, 486 U.S. at 603).
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While the plaintiffs pressed the Webster standard, the federal
government argued in favor of an alternative, lower standard from Thunder
Basin Coal Co. v. Reich. 16 Under Thunder Basin, congressional intent to
preclude federal court review need only be "fairly discernible" 17 where
Congress did not preclude all federal judicial review but merely channeled
review through one specific avenue.
In Elgin, the Supreme Court held that the Webster heightened standard
applies only when a statute purports to remove all federal judicial review of a
constitutional claim. 18 The Court emphasized that federal district court review
is unnecessary when constitutional claims can be "meaningfully addressed in
the Court of Appeals" of the Federal Circuit and that the Elgin plaintiffs' case
therefore did "not present the serious constitutional question that would arise if
an agency statute were construed to preclude all judicial review of a
constitutional claim." 19
The Court went on to note that, "like the statute in Thunder Basin, the
CSRA does not foreclose all judicial review of . . . constitutional claims, but
merely directs that judicial review shall occur in the Federal Circuit." 20
Accordingly, only the lower, "fairly discernible" standard from Thunder Basin
applied. 21 Therefore, the Court held that the federal district court lacked
jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs' non-exhausted claims. 22
While the Court introduced these dual standards as a means to avoid a
"serious constitutional question," that serious constitutional question has
already arisen for probationary federal employees who allege constitutional
violations. For these employees, the only remedy for an alleged constitutional
violation is to file a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel
("OSC"). Under the current scheme, if the historically under-resourced OSC 23
denies the probationary employee's constitutional claim, the employee has no
further remedy available. Within the OSC, review is undertaken by a lone staff
attorney, without a hearing, and with minimal opportunity for input by the
employee-complainant. 24 The OSC staff attorney's decision to deny an

16

510 U.S. 200 (1994).

17

Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2132 (quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 207).

18

See id.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 215 n.20 (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
20
Id.
19

21

Id. at 2132-33.

22

Id. at 2140.

23

Spagnola v. Mathis, 809 F.2d 16, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated in pertinent part and rev'd
on other grounds on reh 'g, 859 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en bane) (per curiam).
24

See 5 U.S.C. § 1214 (2012).
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employee's complaint of constitutional violations is not appealable. 25 To be
clear, there is no further administrative review and no judicial review
whatsoever. The current statutory scheme for federal probationary employees
leaves the entire review of constitutional claims in the hands of a lone staff
attorney within a federal administrative agency. If that lone staff attorney
denies the claim, that decision is the final word. 26
This de minimus level of review of constitutional claims is
unacceptable, because it is insufficient to deter federal employers from
committing unconstitutional acts. For this reason, a Bivens remedy must be
available to ensure meaningful review of the employees' constitutional claims.
Otherwise, the answer to the "serious constitutional question" is that the courts
will abrogate their judicial duty to review the constitutionality of executive
actions affecting individual rights that has been well-established as least as far
back as Marbury v. Madison. 27
Bivens is a judicially-created cause of action that permits an individual
to sue federal actors for damages to remedy constitutional violations. 28 Bivens
is important, not only to remedy past unconstitutional conduct, but to deter
future such conduct by federal actors. In its most recent, comprehensive
articulation of Bivens, the Supreme Court in Minneci v. Pollard29 emphasized
extending Bivens to deter unconstitutional acts by federal actors. 30 When
evaluating whether an alternative, non-Bivens remedial scheme provided by
Congress is sufficient, the Court has assessed whether the scheme provides
"roughly similar incentives" 31 to federal actors to avoid unconstitutional
conduct.
For federal probationary employees, whose only remedy is found in the
·osc, the "roughly similar incentives" to deter unconstitutional acts do not
exist. 32 The "serious constitutional problem" therefore arises in at least the
following respects: the employees are without a meaningful remedy for
constitutional violations, the executive branch will be able to commit
unconstitutional acts without judicial review, and the courts will have ceded
their critical function to a lone staff attorney in the OSC. To afford these

25

Id.

26

The case only proceeds to MSPB and then judicial review
permits it to proceed. See id.
27

if the Office of Special Counsel

5 U.S. 137 (1803).

28

See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
29

132 S. Ct. 617 (2012).

30

See id. at 622.

31

Id. at 626.

32

Id.
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employees the basic promise of Marbury and to restore the separation of
powers, these employees must have a Bivens remedy available to them.
This Article discusses how the Supreme Court's most recent Bivens
jurisprudence must be read to enforce the basic promise of Marbury:
meaningful review for all constitutional claims. It addresses the importance of
the constitutional remedies outlined in Marbury, and will present an example
that highlights the gaping hole in constitutional remedies created by Elgin.
II.

AN EXAMPLE

Bryan Gonzalez was employed as a probationary Border Patrol Agent
from October 15, 2007, to September 16, 2009. 33 He served along the Mexican
border. 34 During the time of his employment with U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, Gonzalez was on two-year probationary status that, but for the
termination of his employment, would have expired in October 2009. 35 Instead,
Gonzalez was fired weeks before he would have become a permanent Border
Patrol Agent. He was fired weeks before he would have been entitled to full
CSRA remedies, including direct access to the MSPB with appeal to the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. 36 At the time of his firing, Gonzalez had been
an exemplary Border Patrol Agent who had received excellent performance
reviews throughout his employment. 37
The facts surrounding his termination are as follows. On April 13,
2009, Gonzalez was patrolling the border between New Mexico and Mexico, as
was Border Patrol Agent Shawn Montoya. 38 On a break, Gonzalez and
Montoya pulled their vehicles alongside each other and began talking about
several things, including the drug-related violence in Mexico. 39 Gonzalez
remarked that legalization of drugs would end the drug war and related
violence in Mexico. 40 He also stated that the drug problems in America were
due to American demand for drugs, supplied from Mexico. 41 Gonzalez
mentioned the organization, Law Enforcement Against Prohibition ("LEAP"),

33
Complaint for Damages and Declaratory Relief ,i 7, Gonzalez v. Manjarrez, No. EP-11CV-29-KC, 2013 WL 152177 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2013), 2011 WL 240799.

34

Id.

35

Id. iJ 7.
Id. ,i 22; see also Gonzalez, 2013 WL 1521 77, at *2.

36

iJ 10.

37

Complaint for Damages and Declaratory Relief, supra note 33, ,i 8.

38

Id.

39

Id. ,i,i 11-12.

40

Id.

41

Id.

iJ 10.
iJ 13.
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made up of former law enforcement officers who oppose the drug war. 42 He
also mentioned the organization's website to Montoya. 43
During the conversation, Montoya asked Gonzalez why Mexicans were
always trying to enter the United States and steal jobs. 44 In response, Gonzalez
replied that the reason Mexicans came to the United States was because of the
lack of jobs in Mexico. 45 Gonzalez noted that he was Mexican because, while
he was born in the United States and was a citizen of the United States, he had
had dual citizenship with Mexico until he was 18 years old. 46
Later, Agent Montoya mentioned Gonzalez's remarks to another
Border Patrol Agent, Richard Carrasquillo. 47 Carrasquillo subsequently
reported Gonzalez's remarks to the Joint Intake Command in Washington, D.C.
Soon thereafter, Customs and Border Patrol commenced an Internal Affairs
Investigation against Gonzalez. 48
Gonzalez was then terminated by the Border Patrol on September 16,
2009. 49 The termination letter stated, in relevant part, that Gonzalez held
"personal views that were contrary to the core characteristics of Border Patrol
Agents, which are patriotism, dedication, and esprit de corps. " 50
Gonzalez filed a complaint with the OSC, alleging that he had been
terminated in violation of his First Amendment right to free speech. The OSC
staff attorney assigned to the case issued a proposed decision denying
Gonzalez's claim, giving Gonzalez 13 days to submit a written response. 51
Gonzalez submitted a written response, but no hearing was held. The OSC then
issued a final denial of Gonzalez's claim, applying the wrong First Amendment
burden of proof and making findings on legal issues that were not set forth in
the initial notice of proposed decision. 52 Gonzalez had no avenue to appeal the
decision.

42

Id. iJ 14.

43

Id.

44

Id. iJ 15.

45

Id.

46

Id. iJ 16.

47

Id. iJ 17.

48

Id. ,i,i 18-19.

49

Id. iJ 20.

49

Id.iJ17.

49

Id. ,i,i 18-19.

50

Id. iJ 21.

51

Letter from Malia S. Myers, Att'y, U.S. Office of Special Counsel, to Bryan Gonzalez
(Sept. 5, 2013) (on file with author).
52
Letter from Malia S. Myers, Att'y, U.S. Office of Special Counsel, to Bryan Gonzalez
(Sept. 30, 2013) (on file with author).
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Gonzalez also filed a lawsuit against the supervisor who terminated
him, pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 53 alleging violations of his First Amendment rights. The federal
district court dismissed Gonzalez's lawsuit, finding that Congress's remedial
scheme, under the CSRA, provided an exclusive remedy in the OSC, and
precluded the extension of Bivens. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
that decision on February 26, 2014. 54 The Court of Appeals stated that
"allowing such a remedy would 'encourage aggrieved employees to bypass the
statutory and administrative remedies [established under the CSRA] in order to
seek direct judicial relief and thereby deprive the Government of the
opportunity to work out its personnel problems within the framework it has so
painstakingly established. "' 55
Thus, the federal courts have failed to enforce the promise of Marbury,
leaving probationary federal employees, like Gonzalez, without an avenue for
meaningful review of constitutional claims.
III. ELGIN V. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

In Elgin v. Department of the Treasury, 56 the Supreme Court repeated
its long-held concern about the "serious constitutional question" that arises in
cases, like Gonzalez's, where Congress precludes all judicial review of
constitutional claims. The Elgin Court addressed whether the CSRA 57 was the
exclusive remedy for federal employees who alleged that the statutes
authorizing their terminations were facially unconstitutional. 58 The Elgin
plaintiff-employees were terminated for having failed to register for the
military selective service. 59 The Selective Service Act 60 barred the employees
from employment with any executive agency for knowingly and willfully
failing to register. 61 Upon discovery that Mr. Elgin had not registered for the
draft, the Department of the Treasury terminated his employment. His coplaintiffs suffered the same fate in other federal agencies. 62
The Elgin plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court and challenged
the Selective Service Act as unconstitutional on its face, arguing that it

53

403 U.S. 388 (1971).

54

Gonzalez v. Manjarrez, 558 F. App'x 350 (5th Cir. 2014).

55

Id. at 353-54 (quoting Broadway v. Block, 694 F.2d 979, 985 (5th Cir. 1982)).

56

132 S. Ct. 2126 (2012).

57

5 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1105 (2013).

58

Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2130.

59

Id. at 2131.

60

5 U.S.C. § 3328 (2013).

61

Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2131.

62

Id.
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constituted a bill of attainder and imposed unlawful discrimination on the basis
of sex in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 63 However, each of the Elgin plaintiffs also had remedies
pursuant to the CSRA, including the right to an adversarial hearing before the
MSPB with appeal to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.
Thus, the question before the Supreme Court in Elgin was the
exclusivity of the CSRA, which required exhaustion of the administrative
remedies before the MSPB with appeal to the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals. 64 The Elgin plaintiffs argued that, because they challenged a statute as
unconstitutional on its face, theirs was not a case that Congress intended to
channel into the CSRA's administrative scheme as the exclusive remedy, and
therefore suit could be brought in a federal district court in the first instance. 65
Primarily, the Elgin plaintiffs relied on Webster v. Doe's heightened "clear
intent" standard, arguing because there was not clear intent to abrogate general
federal question jurisdiction, they could bring their lawsuit in federal district
court. 66
In Webster, an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency challenged
his termination when the Agency fired him shortly after he disclosed that he
was gay. 67 The defendant employer in Webster moved to dismiss, arguing that
section 102(c) of the National Security Act 68 precluded judicial review of the
plaintiffs termination, including plaintiffs constitutional claims arising from
the termination. 69 The Supreme Court rejected that argument, noting that it had
repeatedly re-affirmed that when Congress intends to preclude judicial review
of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear. 70 "We require this
heightened showing in part to avoid the 'serious constitutional question' that
would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a
colorable constitutional claim." 71 Finding that even the strong language of the
National Security Act (that favored deference to agency decision-making)
failed to evidence the "heightened showing" of clear congressional intent to
foreclose judicial review of constitutional claims, the Court held in Webster
that the employee's constitutional claim could be reviewed by a federal district

63

Id.

64

Id. at2130-31.

65

Id. at 2131.

66

Id. at 2132.

67

Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 595-96 (1988).

68

50 U.S.C. § 3036(e)(l) (2012).

69

Webster, 486 U.S. at 603.

70

Id.

71

Id.
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court. 72 There was insufficient evidence of congressional intent to preclude
judicial review.
In Elgin, however, the Court rejected plaintiff-employees' contention
that Webster should apply, clarifying the standard that applies when a federal
court must discern whether Congress intended to preclude federal court review
of constitutional claims. 73 The Court weighed the application of the Webster
"heightened" standard versus the lower standard from Thunder Basin Coal Co.
v. Reich, 74 the latter of which requires only that congressional intent to preclude
federal district court review be "fairly discernible." 75 In Thunder Basin, the
Court addressed whether the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act
of 1977 76 ("MSHA") properly precluded federal district court jurisdiction. The
MSHA required that pre-enforcement challenges be addressed by the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, with appeal to the U.S. Courts of
Appeals. 77 The Supreme Court found that it was "fairly discernible" that
Congress had meant to preclude federal district court jurisdiction. 78 The lower,
"fairly discernible" standard had been applied in Thunder Basin because
Congress had not intended to completely preclude federal court jurisdiction,
rather it merely channeled it into one avenue. 79
In Elgin, the Court explained that the heightened Webster standard
applies only when "a statute ... purports to 'deny any judicial forum for a
colorable constitutional claim."' 80 "Webster's standard does not apply where
Congress simply channels judicial review of a constitutional claim to a
particular court." 81 The Elgin Court emphasized that federal district court
review is unnecessary when constitutional claims can be "meaningfully
addressed in the Court of Appeals" on appeal from MSPB and that the Elgin
plaintiffs' case therefore did "not present the 'serious constitutional question'
that would arise if an agency statute were construed to preclude all judicial
review of a constitutional claim." 82 The Court went on to note that, "[l]ike the
statute in Thunder Basin, the CSRA does not foreclose all judicial review of ...

72

Id. at 603--04.

73

Elgin v. Dep't ofTreasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2132-33 (2012).

74

510 U.S. 200 (1994).

75

Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2132.

76

30 U.S.C. §§ 801-804 (2013).

77

30 U.S.C. § 816; Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 204.

78

Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 216.

79

Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2132.

80

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988)).

81

Id.
Id. (quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 215 n.20).

82
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constitutional claims, but merely directs that judicial review shall occur in the
Federal Circuit." 83
Accordingly, the ultimate impact of Elgin is that the Supreme Court
has clarified the application of the different standards necessary to preclude
federal court review of constitutional claims. When a statutory scheme merely
channels constitutional claims into an administrative process before judicial
review in the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, a court need only ascertain
whether Congress's intent to preclude all federal district court review is "fairly
discernible." 84 However, in order to preclude all judicial review of
constitutional claims, the statute must satisfy the "heightened showing" from
Webster; that is, it must evidence a "clear" intent by Congress to do so. 85 In
Elgin, the Supreme Court confirmed that the Webster standard should apply to
a case such as Bryan Gonzalez's, because an OSC denial forecloses any
judicial review of constitutional claims, such as Gonzalez's First Amendment
claims. That raises the very "serious constitutional question" the Supreme
Court was so concerned about in Elgin 86 : whether Congress can remove all
opportunity for judicial review of constitutional claims. But before getting to
the "answer" to that question (extending Bivens), it is critical to understand
exactly what the Court meant when it referenced the seriousness of the
constitutional question at hand.
IV. THE SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

The "serious constitutional question" referenced in Elgin-a question
that strikes at the core of our government's balance of powers-is over 200
years old: what is the duty of Article III courts to review executive action to
ensure its constitutionality? It is the delicate nature of this question that has led
the Supreme Court to require a "heightened showing" of congressional intent to
preclude all judicial review of constitutional claims. 87 Instead of holding that
Congress has precluded judicial review and thereby exceeded its authority, the
Court has assumed a judicial remedy when it can in the interest of harmony.
This approach helps avoid a constitutional separation of powers conflict
between the Court and Congress. 88 The presumption is, and should be, that
Congress does not intend to preclude all judicial review under Article III.
Anything less would frequently place the Court on a collision course with
Congress over the power of judicial review.
83

Id. (emphasis added).

84

Id.

85

Id.

86

Id.

87

Id.

88

See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85 (1868);
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 660 (1996) (repeals by implication are not favored).
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When the Supreme Court was confronted with that serious question
long ago, it answered definitively. "It is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is." 89 Chief Justice John Marshall in
Marbury emphasized that was particularly true where individuals sought
vindication of legal rights. 90 Indeed, perhaps even more important to the federal
probationary employees is Marbury's holding that, where there is a right, there
must be a remedy. 91 And by remedy, the Supreme Court has made clear that it
means a constitutionally adequate remedy, to wit: one that provides incentive to
avoid unconstitutional acts.
The significance of Marbury's affirmation of the duty of judicial
review over allegedly unconstitutional acts by a member of the executive
branch is illuminated by tracing backwards from Elgin through the Court's
most recent discussions of the "serious constitutional question."
First, one should look at the lower standard set forth in Thunder Basin.
There, in applying the minimal "fairly discernible" standard, the Court noted
that "'[a]djudication of the constitutionality of congressional enactments has
generally been thought beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies. "' 92
The Court noted that rule was "perhaps of less consequence" where, as in
Thunder Basin, the reviewing body was not an actual federal agency, but an
independent commission established exclusively to adjudicate disputes that
arose under the statutory scheme (in that case, the MSHA). 93 The Court also
noted that the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission had
"addressed constitutional questions in previous enforcement proceedings" and
that, even if that had not been the case, the constitutional claims at issue in
Thunder Basin could have been "meaningfully addressed in the Court of
Appeals" after the Commission rendered its decision. 94 For this reason, there
was no serious constitutional question in Thunder Basin because ultimately,
judicial review of any constitutional claim was available at the appellate level.
Thus, the Supreme Court said it need only ascertain whether it was "fairly
discernible" that Congress meant to channel all constitutional claims through
the commission and into the Courts of Appeals, rather than permitting them to
first be heard in federal district court. 95

89

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

90

Id. at 162-63.

91

Id. at 163.

92

Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 215 (1994) (quoting Johnson v. Robison,
415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974)).
93

Id. (citing Secretaryv. Richardson, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. 8, 18-20 (1981)).

94

Id.
Id. at 216.

95
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The alternative standard discussed by the Court and parties in Elgin
was the heightened standard from Webster. 96 The terminated employee in
Webster claimed that section 102 of the Administrative Procedures Act
precluded judicial review of his constitutional claims, and thus, federal district
court review must be made available. 97 In Webster, the Court rejected the
argument that the Administrative Procedures Act could be read to exclude all
judicial review of constitutional claims 98 :
We emphasized in Johnson v. Robison, that where Congress
intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its
intent to do so must be clear. In Weinberger v. Salfi, we
reaffirmed that view. We require this heightened showing in
part to avoid the "serious constitutional question" that would
arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial
forum for a colorable constitutional claim. 99
In Johnson v. Robison, 100 referenced by the Court in Webster, the Court
interpreted a veterans' benefits statute 101 and concluded that it did not mean to
preclude federal district court litigation challenging the law as
unconstitutional. 102 "Such a construction would, of course, raise serious
questions concerning the constitutionality of§ 211." 103

96

See Elgin v. Dep't of the Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126 (2012).

97

Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 597 (1988).

98

Id. at 603.

99
Id. (citations omitted) (citing Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 4 76 U.S. 667,
681 n.12 (1986)). Justice Scalia, dissenting in Webster, rejected the seriousness of the question:
I tum, then, to the substance of the Court's warning that judicial review of all
"colorable constitutional claims" arising out the respondent's dismissal may
well be constitutionally required. What could possibly be the basis for this
fear? Surely not some general principle that all constitutional violations must
be remediable in the courts. The very text of the Constitution refutes that
principle ....

Once it is acknowledged, as I think it must be, (I) that not all
constitutional claims require a judicial remedy, and (2) that the identification
of those that do not can, even if only within narrow limits, be determined by
Congress, then it is clear that the "serious constitutional question" feared by
the Court is an illusion.
Id. at 612, 614 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
too 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
IOI

Id. at 366-67.

102

Id. at 367.
Plainly, no explicit provision of§ 21 l(a) bars judicial consideration of
appellee's constitutional claims. That section provides that 'the decisions of
the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law administered
by the Veterans' Administration providing benefits for veterans ... shall be
final and conclusive and no ... court of the United States shall have power or
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In distinguishing Johnson in Weinberger v. Salji, 104 the Court
construed the Social Security Act to provide district court jurisdiction over
constitutional claims, after review by the Secretary of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare. In concluding that the Social Security Act
could not be read to preclude all federal court jurisdiction over constitutional
claims, the Court said: "Not only would such a restriction have been
extraordinary, such that 'clear and convincing' evidence would be required
before we would ascribe such intent to Congress, but it would have raised a
serious constitutional question of the validity of the statute as so construed." 105
The reason the Court avoided any reading of the statutes at issue in
Johnson and Salfi that would have precluded all judicial review, and questioned
the constitutionality of the statutes under such a construction, is that such
preclusion would have undermined the power of judicial review. Based in
Marbury, 106 the notion that judicial review must be available to review
constitutionality of executive action was steadily reinforced throughout the
nation's history. 107 Also reinforced is judicial resistance to any action on the
part of Congress that could be construed to remove the "essential function" of
jurisdiction to review any such decision .... ' (Emphasis added.) .... Thus,
as the District Court stated: 'The questions of law presented in these
proceedings arise under the Constitution, not under the statute whose validity
is challenged.'
Id. (quoting Robison v. Johnson, 352 F. Supp. 848, 853 (D. Mass. 1973), rev'd, 415 U.S. 361
(1974)).
103
Id. at 366. The Court added that in such case "it is a cardinal principle that this Court will
first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional]
question[s] may be avoided." Id. at 366-67 (quoting United States v. Thirty-Seven (37)
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971)).
104

422 U.S. 749 (1975).

105

Id. at 762 (citations omitted) (citing Johnson, 415 U.S. at 373). The Court added:
In the present case, as will be discussed below, the Social Security Act itself
provides jurisdiction for constitutional challenges to its provisions. Thus the
plain words of the third sentence of§ 405(h) do not preclude constitutional
challenges. They simply require that they be brought under jurisdictional
grants contained in the Act, and thus in conformity with the same standards
which are applicable to nonconstitutional claims arising under the Act. The
result is not only of unquestionable constitutionality, but it is also manifestly
reasonable, since it assures the Secretary the opportunity prior to
constitutional litigation to ascertain, for example, that the particular claims
involved are neither invalid for other reasons nor allowable under other
provisions of the Social Security Act.

Id.
106

Marbury is of course generally cited as the seminal case, although some sources for the
doctrine pre-date it. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW§ 1.4(b) (5th ed. 2012).
107
Indeed, this fundamental notion was reaffirmed this past term in NLRB v. Canning, 134 S.
Ct. 2550, 2559-60 (2014) ("We recognize, of course, that the separation of powers can serve to
safeguard individual liberty and that it is the 'duty of the judicial department'-in a separationof-powers case as in any other-'to say what the law is."' (citations omitted)).
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the federal ~udiciary to interpret the constitution and to answer questions of
federal law. 08
Ex parte McCardle 109 and Ex parte Yerger 110 are two Civil War era
cases long held as establishing the principle that the Supreme Court would not
infer congressional repeal of its jurisdiction over questions of federal or
constitutional law. The importance of this judicial protection of its jurisdiction
was reinforced most recently in Felker v. Turpin, 11 where the Court refused to
find that Congress had, in the Anti Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act, 112 implicitly removed all of the Court jurisdiction over petitions for writs
of habeas corpus. 113 "As we declined to find a repeal of§ 14 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 as applied to this Court by implication [in McCardle and Yerger],
we decline to find a similar repeal of. .. its [statutory] descendant ... by
implication now." 114
During the New Deal era, concerns were raised about the
constitutionality of Congress channeling to one avenue challenges to executive
action taken pursuant to New Deal legislation. In Yakus v. United States, 115 a
man was prosecuted for violating federal price controls. In his defense, the man
challenged the price controls as a violation of due process. The Supreme Court
held that the federal district court deciding the criminal case did not have
jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of a federal agency's decisions or
108
See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction ofFederal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1378-79 (1953) (noting the importance of
judicial review when "an enforceable legal duty is involved").
109
110
Ill

ll2
3

74 U.S. 506 (1868).
75 U.S. 85 (1868).
518 U.S. 651 (1996).
Id. at 658.

u
Id. In the context of federal versus state courts as remedial alternatives, Professor Gerald
Gunther discussed the tensions there involving the adequacy of state court systems. These
adequacy concerns are even more present when a lone federal bureaucrat has the lone
responsibility for assessing a constitutional claim:
All agree that Congress cannot bar all remedies for enforcing federal
constitutional rights. The difficulty lies with the relevance rather than the
acceptability of that principle .... To cut off the jurisdiction of some or all
federal courts over specified classes of cases is not to cut off all remedies,
given the existence of state courts and their traditionally assumed
competence and indeed constitutional obligation to enforce federal rights. In
short, the argument that curbing federal jurisdiction denies all remedies rests
on a questionable assumption about the "inherent inadequacy of the state
courts."
Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated
Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REv. 895, 921 n.113 (1984) (quoting Martin H.
Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A
Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 143, 157 (1982)).
114
Felker, 518 U.S. at 661.
115
321 U.S. 414, 427-44 (1944).
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regulations as applied to Mr. Yakus, because the Emergency Price Control Act
conferred exclusive jurisdiction of review of the agency's decisions to the
Emergency Court of ApReals and the United States Supreme Court for claims
arising under the Act. 1 6 In doing so, the Court emphasized that the mere
channeling of constitutional claims did not present a constitutional concern. 117
All of these cases demonstrate the Court's willingness to avoid a battle
with Congress over the scope of the power of judicial review of constitutional
claims. In each of these cases, however, the Court has (sometimes by bending
over backwards) 118 found that an avenue remained for judicial review of
constitutional questions. The question that remains is the appropriate judicial
response when there is no judicial review of the constitutional question in a
certain case, and the Court could not possibly find an avenue for judicial
review, as in the case of federal probationary employees. The answer is found
by permitting a civil rights lawsuit against the federal government pursuant to
Bivens. Otherwise, the Court will have run afoul of its longstanding answer to
the very serious constitutional question raised when Congress usurps the plain
duty of the judiciary.
V.

THE ANSWER: WHY A BIVENS REMEDY MUST EXIST TO ENSURE
MEANINGFUL REVIEW

To avoid the serious constitutional question that arises when Congress
completely precludes judicial review of a constitutional claim ( as opposed to
simply channeling it into one court), the Supreme Court requires the application
of the "heightened showing" of "clear" intent that Congress intends to preclude
all review. 119 Because the Elgin plaintiffs had "meaningful review" of their
claims in the Federal Circuit, the "heightened showing" standard did not apply
in that case. 120 The concern expressed by the Elgin Court was that Congress
must speak clearly when it intends to exclude plaintiffs with constitutional
claims from any judicial forum in which to air their grievances. 121
From this general principle, that Congress should speak clearly when it
intends to preclude all judicial review of constitutional claims, one can then
move to the more specific question-whether a Bivens remedy should be
extended if Congress otherwise clearly has precluded judicial review of a
constitutional claim. If Congress clearly does preclude judicial review in favor
of an alternative remedy, courts will next examine whether the alternative
116

Id. at 447.

117

Id. at431-43.

118

See Felker, 518 U.S. at 661-62.

119

Elgin v. Dep't of the Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2132 (quoting Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S.
592, 603 (1988)).
120
Id.
121

Id.
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remedy is a "meaningful" one. A review of Supreme Court Bivens
jurisprudence demonstrates the importance of the critical analytical step.
In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that a cause of action existed against
federal actors for violations of constitutional rights. Prior to Bivens,
constitutional rights against federal actors were generally only enforceable
through injunctive relief or the exclusionary rule in criminal cases. 122 In Bivens,
the Court found a cause of action existed against federal actors for Fourth
Amendment violations. "[W]here federally protected rights have been invaded,
it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their
remedies so as to grant the necessary relief." 123 "From the beginning" alludes to
Marbury's declaration that "[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists
in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that
protection." 124
In finding a Bivens remedy, the Court noted that there may be times
when there exist "special factors counseling hesitation" when a court considers
whether to provide a Bivens remedy for a constitutional claim against federal
actors. 125 As an example, the Court noted that the case did not involve a matter
of federal fiscal policy. 126 Nor did the matter involve an instance where
Congress has precluded a damage award but provided some other, "equally
effective" remedy. 127
Justice John M. Harlan pointed out in his important concurrence that
since the general grant of federal question jurisdiction is sufficient to provide a
basis for equitable relief, it should be enough to provide a remedy at law. 128
The Court had long been willing to stop ongoing or threatened constitutional
violations. Harlan noted, "For people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or
nothing." 129
According to the most recent Supreme Court cases determining
whether to extend remedies brought pursuant to Bivens, the decision requires
two steps: "In the first place, there is the question whether any alternative,
existing process for protecting the [constitutionally recognized] interest

122
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 9.1.2 (5th ed. 2007); see Larson v.
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689 (1949).
123
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392
(1971) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
124

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).

125

See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
Id.

126
127

Id. at 397.

128

Id. at 400-11 (Harlan, J., concurring).

129

Id. at 410.
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amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from
providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages." 130
The second question is whether there exists any "special factors
counseling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation." 131
Lack of a meaningful, alternative review will weigh in favor of the Court
extending a Bivens remedy, barring other "special factors counseling
hesitation," 132 such as claims brought against the military. 133
Applying these two questions to the federal probationary employee
context, the alternative, non-judicial remedy for such claims must be
"meaningful"-that is, it must provide "roughly similar incentives" compelling
federal actors to comply with the Constitution. 134 And as noted, placing a
probationary employee's constitutional violation entirely in the hands of a lone
staff attorney at the OSC does not provide the "roughly similar incentives" for
constitutional compliance. A Bivens remedy should be extended in such a case
because the alternative remedy is not meaningful; an Office of Special Counsel
review does not carry "roughly similar incentives" to command constitutional
compliance from federal actors.
In the Supreme Court's most recent Bivens case, Minneci v. Pollard, 135
the Court emphasized that the effectiveness of the alternative remedy turns on
its deterrent effect. 136 That is, in deciding whether or not a Bivens remedy is
available, a court must look to whether or not the alternative remedy offers
"roughly similar incentives" for the federal actor to avoid unconstitutional
conduct as a cause of action in federal district court for damages. 137 Even
before the Court clearly based its extension of a Bivens remedy on the
"deterrent value," the cases discussing Bivens demonstrated an assessment of
meaningful alternative remedies. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized that the alternative remedy must be "meaningful." 138
In refusing to extend Bivens in the case most closely analogous to that
of the federal probationary employee, the Court assessed the effectiveness of

130

Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 621 (2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Wilkie v.
Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007)).
131

Id. (quoting Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550).

132

Id. (quoting Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550).
See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298-300 (1983) (special factors related to the
military counsel against implying a Bivens action); see also United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S.
669, 683-84 (1987). These "special factors" in the second step of a Bivens determination are not
applicable in Gonzalez's case.
133

134

Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 625.

135

132 S. Ct. 617 (2012).
Id. at 627.

136
137
138

Id. at 625.

See id. at 622 (discussing prior Supreme Court holdings where a Bivens action was not
implied because of meaningful alternative remedies available).
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the alternative remedy. In Bush v. Lucas, 139 the Supreme Court rejected a
federal employee's Bivens claim for damages because the employee already
had CSRA remedies available to him, which he in fact utilized. The Court
found that the CSRA remedies were "comprehensive procedural and
substantive provisions giving meaningful remedies against the United
States." 140 The Bush Court held that additional Bivens remedies were not
necessary where the CSRA "provides meaningful remedies for employees." 141
In a case such as Gonzalez's, however, because the OSC chose not to petition
MSPB on Gonzalez's behalf, he will have no remedy, much less a
"meaningful" one as required by the Supreme Court in Elgin, 142 unless the
court permits a Bivens action.
Like Gonzalez, the Bush plaintiffs were federal employees who alleged
First Amendment violations. However, these employees had access to the full
CSRA remedies, including a three-day, adversarial, public hearing before the
MSPB, with appeal to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. Given this, the
Court found the employees had access to alternative remedies that were an
"equally effective substitute" when compared to the proposed Bivens remedy,
and thus the Court declined to extend Bivens. 143
Likewise, in Schweiker v. Chi/icky, 144 the Court addressed claims
brought pursuant to Bivens by individuals who had been wrongfully denied
Social Security disability benefits by Reagan Administration officials. After the
systemic denials, Congress acted to establish a statutory process by which
individuals who claimed they had been wrongfully denied could seek relief. As
in Bush, the statutory scheme provided a sufficient alternative avenue,
including judicial review of any constitutional claims arising from the denial of
their payments. 145 The Court declined to extend Bivens, holding that the
statutory scheme was a constitutionally adequate alternative. 146
Similarly, in Davis v. Passman, 147 the Court considered a former
congressional employee's claim for damages suffered as a result of her
employer's unconstitutional discrimination based on gender. In extending a
Bivens claim to the employee in that case, the Court emphasized the

139

462 U.S. 367 (1983).

140

Id. at 368.

141

Id. at 386.
Elgin v. Dep't of Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2132 (2012).

142
143

Bush, 462 U.S. at 378 n.14.

144

487 U.S. 412 (1988).

145

Id. at 424, 428-29.

146

Id. at 429.

147

442 U.S. 228 (1979).
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unavailability of "other alternative forms of judicial relief." 148 As the Supreme
Court noted in Davis v. Passman:
At least in the absence of a "textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment · of [an] issue to a coordinate
political department," we presume that justiciable
constitutional rights are to be enforced through the courts. And,
unless such rights are to become merely precatory, the class of
those litigants who allege that their own constitutional rights
have been violated, and who at the same time have no effective
means other than the judiciary to enforce these rights, must be
able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the
protection of their justiciable constitutional rights. 149
Despite complaints by members of the Supreme Court that the "heady
days" of extending Bivens to new situations have passed, 150 the Court has
recently clarified the law in two important cases, Wilkie v. Robbins 151 and
Minneci v. Pollard. 152
In Wilkie, the Court addressed an effort to extend a Bivens remedy to a
rancher who claimed a variety of harassment by Bureau of Land Management
officials. 153 At the end of the day, the case is unique, in that the Court declined
to extend Bivens in part because the complexity of the multitude of potential
claims the rancher might have brought counseled against extending Bivens. 154
But most importantly for the issue discussed in this Article, the Court noted
that, even without Bivens, the rancher had "an administrative, and ultimately a
judicial, process for vindicating virtually all of his complaints." 155 That is,
rancher Robbins had and avenue for meaningful review. Notably, in dicta in
Wilkie, the Court noted that what it did not have before them was a hypothetical
case much like Bryan Gonzalez's. "Robbins's claim of retaliation for
exercising his property right to exclude the Government does not fit this
Court's retaliation cases, which involve an allegation of impermissible purpose

148

Id. at 245 (emphasis added).

149

Id. at 242 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Corr. Servs. Corp. v.
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 72-73 (2001) (considering availability of state tort remedies in refusing to
recognize a Bivens remedy).
150
Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Bivens is a relic of the heady days in
which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action-decreeing them to be
'implied' by the mere existence of a statutory or constitutional prohibition.").
151

551 U.S. 537 (2007).

152

132 S. Ct. 617 (2012).

153

See generally Wilkie, 551 U.S. 537.

154

Id. at 555.

155

Id. at 553.
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and motivation-e.g., an employee is fired after speaking out on matters of
public concern." 156
Most recently, in Minneci, the Court declined to extend Bivens to
Eighth Amendment claims brought by inmates against employees at privatelyoperated prisons. 157 The Court emphasized that the key factor in deciding
whether or not to extend Bivens is the extent to which an alternative remedy
provides sufficiently similar deterrent effects to keep federal actors from
violating the Constitution. 158 In Minneci, the inmates were able to bring state
law tort claims against the employees of the private prison, which the Court
found had sufficiently similar deterrent value, precluding the extension of
Bivens.
The Court's conclusion in Minneci properly reconciled a long line of
otherwise seemingly inconsistent cases handed down interpreting Bivens. In
Minneci, the Supreme Court defined a "meaningful" alternative remedy as one
that provides "roughly similar incentives for potential defendants to comply
with [the constitutional requirements] while also providing roughly similar
compensation to victims of violations." 159 There can be little doubt that
subjecting a First Amendment violation for review by a likely overtaxed
administrative agency such as the OSC does not carry "roughly similar
incentives" to comply with the constitution as would review by an Article III
court. 160 Because the OSC does not provide "roughly similar incentives for
constitutional compliance," 161 federal probationary employees do not have the
guarantee of meaningful review.
Two recent decisions from the Courts of Appeals further illuminate this
analysis. In Engel v. Buchan, 162 the Seventh Circuit extended a Bivens claim to
a plaintiff alleging due process violations resulting from prosecutors' failure to
abide by the disclosure requirement articulated in Brady v. Maryland. 163 In
response to the Bivens suit brought in Engel, the prosecutors argued that the
Brady requirement itself, combined with the right to petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, was sufficient to remedy any due process violations. 164 The

156

Id. at 539 (citing Bd. ofCnty. Comm'rs, Wabaunsee Cnty., Kan. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668,
675 (1996)).
157

Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012).

158

Id.

159

Id. at 625 (alteration in original).

°

16

Contrast the alternative remedies available in Minneci: "[I]n principle, the question is
whether, in general, state tort law remedies provide roughly similar incentives for potential
defendants to comply with the Eighth Amendment while also providing roughly similar
compensation to victims of violations .... [T]he answer to this question is 'yes."' Id.
161
Id.
162

710 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2013).

163

373 U.S. 83 (1963).

164

Engel, 710 F.3d at 705--06.
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Seventh Circuit applied the Wilkie formula: the "first question . . . is whether
alternative remedies exist to redress the alleged violation of Engel's dueprocess rights, and whether those alternatives amount to a 'convincing reason'
to refrain from extending Bivens here." 165 The Seventh Circuit noted that the
alternative remedy must provide "roughly similar incentives" for compliance
with constitutional requirements and "roughly similar compensation to victims
of violations." 166 The Seventh Circuit then held that compliance with Brady and
the use of habeas corpus did not provide sufficiently similar incentives or
compensation to the plaintiff. 167
Contrast Engel with ME.S., Inc., v. Snell, 168 a recent case refusing to
extend a Bivens remedy to a contractor bringing constitutional claims, who had
an alternative remedy under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 ("CDA''). 169 In
declining to extend Bivens, the Second Circuit noted that under the CDA, an
aggrieved contractor had an administrative remedy followed by "further
review ... in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit." 170
Unlike a federal probationary employee's case, in Snell, the CDA statutory
scheme ultimately included judicial review, thus ensuring meaningful
review. 171
An alleged remedy whose availability depends upon the "discretion" of
a government bureaucrat is no remedy at all, especially when constitutional
rights are involved. It is significant that, in all of these cases addressing the
refusal to recognize a Bivens remedy, the Court has deferred to an
administrative remedy that ultimately includes judicial review. Why? Because
that provides "similar incentives" for the federal actors to avoid
unconstitutional conduct. For this reason, Bivens should be extended to a case
involving federal probationary employees as well.

165

Engel, 710 F.3d at 705 (quoting Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007)).

166

Id. (quoting Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 625).

167

See id. at 706 ("The failure of the government's agents to adhere to the Brady obligation is
the very constitutional wrong that wants for redress, so it cannot be right to say that the duty of
disclosure is itself a sufficient remedy for the constitutional violation. The disclosure rule cannot
be both the duty and the remedy for its violation .... The habeas writ is akin to an injunction; it
cannot provide a retrospective compensatory remedy. Stated differently, habeas corpus is
categorically incapable of compensating the victim of a Brady violation for the constitutional
injury he has suffered.").
168

712 F.3d 666 (2d Cir. 2013).

169

41

u.s.c. §§ 7101-7107 (2013).

170

Snell, 712 F.3d at 673.

171

Id.
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VI. WHY THE TYPE OF RELIEF SOUGHT SHOULD NOT MATTER

Elgin is an expression of the Court's view that meaningful remedies
must be provided for all constitutional claims, whether they are equitable in
nature or Bivens claims for damages. Elgin was not a Bivens suit. The
employees in Elgin were seeking money for back pay, benefits, and attorneys'
fees as part of their claims for equitable relief. But the Elgin Court never
focused on the fact that the Elgin plaintiffs were seeking only money in the
form of equitable relief as opposed to money from a Bivens damages claim. 172
As then-Judge Alito said in Mitchum v. Hurt, 173 "We assume that the
power of the federal courts to award legal and e~uitable relief in actions under
28 U.S.C. § 1331 stems from the same source." 74 The source is Article IIIthat is, the power of judicial review. There is no question as to whether or not
the Court has the power to award both. 175 The question is only-should they?
The Court's Bivens jurisprudence provides the answer: if there is not an
alternative remedy with a sufficient deterrent effect, the Court will permit
judicial determination of equitable relief or monetary damages.
On that point, distinguishing between equitable relief and Bivens
damages 176 would be inconsistent with the notion of "similar incentives"

172

The manner in which the Elgin Court distinguishes its earlier opinion in United States v.
Fausto underscores this. In Fausto, the Court held that Congress intended to preclude all judicial
review of the plaintiff's statutory claims for back pay damages. In distinguishing Fausto, the
Court in Elgin noted that "heightened scrutiny" need not apply "because Fausto did not press any
constitutional claims." Elgin v. Dep't of Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2133 n.4 (2012) (citing
Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 440-41, 448 (1988)).
173

73 F.3d 30 (3d Cir. 1995).

174

Id. at 35-36. Justice Brandeis made the same point in his concurring opinion in St. Joseph
Stock Yards v. United States: "To that extent, the person asserting a right, whatever its source,
should be entitled to the independent judgment of a court on the ultimate question of
constitutionality." 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
175

See Arakawa v. Reagan, 666 F. Supp. 254, 259 n.8 (D.D.C. 1987) ("It seems to this Court
that the Supreme Court's decision was predicated on the concept of deference to the legislature's
choice of a remedial scheme, and had nothing to do with the fact [that] only damages were
sought."); see also Bryant v. Cheney, 924 F.2d 525, 528 n.2 (4th Cir. 1991) ("Resolution of this
issue is made more difficult by a distinction the Supreme Court seems to have drawn between
Bivens actions for damages and equitable claims for injunctive or declaratory relief.").
176
Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2132 (backpay, declaratory, and injunctive relief); Thunder Basin Coal
Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 215-16 & n.20 (1994) (an injunction); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S.
592, 603 (1988) (respondent sought no monetary damages); Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family
Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986) (challenge to validity of agency regulation);
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762 (1975) (declaratory and injunctive relief); Johnson v.
Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-67 (1974) (declaratory judgment); United States v. Thirty-Seven
(37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369-74 (1971) (injunctions); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414, 427-44 (1944) (injunction); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co., 298 U.S. at 84 (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (injunction).
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discussed in Minneci. 177 As Justice Harlan said in his Bivens concurrence, for
some people, it is "damages or nothing." 178 While the Supreme Court has
indicated that equitable remedies are the usual course, the Supreme Court in
Minneci also noted that damages are the historic remedy for invasion of a
personal interest. 179 And in cases such as Elgin, the Court has not focused on
distinguishing between equitable relief and damages claims when expressing
concern regarding the "serious constitutional questions."
VII. EXTENDING BIVENS TO PROBATIONARY FEDERAL EMPLOYEES Is
CONSISTENT WITH THE COURT'S CONCERNS ABOUT PRESERVING THE
INTEGRITY OF ARTICLE III COURTS.

Ensuring that an administrative agency does not have final say over
constitutional claims is also consistent with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
addressing congressional efforts to delegate judicial decision-making to nonArticle III judges. The most recent case addressing this issue is Stern v.
Marshall, 180a "teaching opinion" authored by Chief Justice John Roberts where
he reviewed the evolution of the Court's precedent. In Stern, the Court held that
a non-Article III bankruptcy court could not render the final decision on a
counterclaim brought by the parties for tortious interference with contractual
relations. 181 The Court emphasized that, when a traditional common law suit is
within the bounds of federal court jurisdiction, "the responsibility for deciding
that suit rests with Article III judges in Article III courts." 182 The Court
explained:
Article III could neither serve its purpose in the system of
checks and balances nor preserve the integrity of judicial
decisionmaking if the other branches of the Federal
Government could confer the Government's "judicial Power"
on entities outside Article III. That is why we have long
recognized that, in general, Congress may not "withdraw from
judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the
subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty."
When a suit is made of "the stuff of the traditional actions at
common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789," and
is brought within the bounds of federal jurisdiction, the
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responsibility for deciding that suit rests with Article III judges
in Article III courts. The Constitution assigns that job-resolution of "the mundane as well as the glamorous, matters
of common law and statute as well as constitutional law, issues
of fact as well as issues oflaw"-to the Judiciary. 183
These same· duties-including the duty to resolve cases involving the
"mundane" or the "glamorous"-apply to constitutional claims brought by
federal probationary employees. Similarly, Congress should not be permitted to
"withdraw from judicial cognizance" such claims, by channeling review to a
lone staff attorney in the Office of Special Counsel.
VIII. THE INCONSISTENT REMEDIES PROBLEM

Is there a problem because a probationary employee has a Bivens
remedy in federal district court, when fulltime federal employees must resort to
the machinations of the CSRA remedial scheme? Yes, that is an unforeseen
inconsistency that Congress's scheme has created. 184 However, the problem is
Congress's to fix. If it provided a sufficient alternative remedy, with "roughly
similar incentives" to deter constitutional violations by federal actors, there
would be no need to extend Bivens. It is relatively easy to channel review
through a federal court of appeals. But barring such action, the courts must
satisfy their duty of judicial review.
IX. CONCLUSION

Although litigants may not often choose to seek relief, it is
important, in a civilized society, that the judicial branch of the
Nation's government stand ready to afford a remedy in these
circumstances. 185
Despite the narrowing by the Court of the scenarios to which Bivens
should apply, it has consistently demanded that some meaningful review be
available for constitutional claims. Its expression of concern in Elgin confirms
that it still considers congressional attempts to remove all power of the
judiciary to review allegedly unconstitutional executive acts a "serious

183
Id. (citations omitted). The Court also asked itself: "Is there really a threat to the separation
of powers where Congress has conferred the judicial power outside Article III only over certain
counterclaims in bankruptcy? The short but emphatic answer is yes." Id. at 2620.
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constitutional question." In order to ensure that constitutional rights are
vindicated and future wrongs are deterred, probationary federal employees
must have access to federal court, so that the judiciary may fulfill its duty to
"say what the law is." Because that access is not guaranteed by administrative
review in the Office of Special Counsel, a Bivens remedy must be extended to
those employees who allege constitutional violations against their federal
employer.

